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Background: Post-marketing withdrawal of medicinal products because of deaths can be occasioned by evidence
obtained from case reports, observational studies, randomized trials, or systematic reviews. There have been no
studies of the pattern of withdrawals of medicinal products to which deaths have been specifically attributed and
the evidence that affects such decisions. Our objectives were to identify medicinal products that were withdrawn
after marketing in association with deaths, to search for the evidence on which withdrawal decisions were based,
and to analyse the delays involved and the worldwide patterns of withdrawal.
Methods: We searched the World Health Organization’s Consolidated List of [Medicinal] Products, drug regulatory
authorities’ websites, PubMed, Google Scholar, and textbooks on adverse drug reactions. We included medicinal
products for which death was specifically mentioned as a reason for withdrawal from the market. Non-human
medicines, herbal products, and non-prescription medicines were excluded. One reviewer extracted the data and a
second reviewer verified them independently.
Results: We found 95 drugs for which death was documented as a reason for withdrawal between 1950 and 2013.
All were withdrawn in at least one country, but at least 16 remained on the market in some countries. Withdrawals
were more common in European countries; few were recorded in Africa (5.3%). The more recent the launch date,
the sooner deaths were reported. However, in 47% of cases more than 2 years elapsed between the first report of a
death and withdrawal of the drug, and the interval between the first report of a death attributed to a medicinal
product and eventual withdrawal of the product has not improved over the last 60 years.
Conclusions: These results suggest that some deaths associated with these products could have been avoided.
Manufacturers and regulatory authorities should expedite investigations when deaths are reported as suspected
adverse drug reactions and consider early suspensions. Increased transparency in the publication of clinical trials
data and improved international co-ordination could shorten the delays in withdrawing dangerous medicinal
products after reports of deaths and obviate discrepancies in drug withdrawals in different countries.
Please see related article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12916-015-0270-2.
Keywords: Death, Drug withdrawal, Review, Voluntary recall* Correspondence: igho.onakpoya@phc.ox.ac.uk
Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences, Centre for
Evidence-based Medicine, University of Oxford, New Radcliffe House,
Radcliffe Observatory Quarter, Oxford OX2 6GG, UK
© 2015 Onakpoya et al.; licensee BioMed Central. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
unless otherwise stated.
Onakpoya et al. BMC Medicine  (2015) 13:26 Page 2 of 11Background
When a medicinal product is found to cause death as an
adverse reaction, one would expect expedited investiga-
tion of the problem and, when indicated, withdrawal of
the product from the market. However, the relation be-
tween occurrences of deaths and the time to withdrawal
of responsible products has not hitherto been studied.
When drug regulatory authorities consider that a me-
dicinal product has a favourable benefit-to-harm bal-
ance, they award a licence and the product becomes
available [1]. However, some adverse reactions are dis-
covered only after approval and marketing [2,3], in
which case regulators have several possible courses of
action, depending on the risk and seriousness of the ad-
verse reaction. They can:
 Require the reaction to be added to the label
(§4.8, “Undesirable effects”, in the EU Summaries of
Product Characteristics) [4];
 Require the addition of a warning (§4.4, “Special
warnings and precautions for use”) [4];
 Require the addition of a contraindication (§4.3), if
applicable [4];
 Allow the patient, informed by the prescriber, to
decide whether to use the drug;
 Require an amendment to any Post-Authorization
Safety Study that is being performed as a condition
of the licence;
 Require a revision of specific risk minimization
measures mentioned in the product’s Risk
Management Plan;
 Require the marketing authorization holder
(MAH) to issue a Direct Health-care Professional
Communication (e.g., a “Dear John” letter);
 In the USA, require the use of a Black Box warning,
which confirms that the drug carries a significant
risk of a serious adverse reaction.
The MAH may take some of these actions themselves
without being required to do so by the regulators. The
final regulatory action would be to suspend or revoke
the licence, and the MAH sometimes withdraws a drug
voluntarily before being forced to by the regulator. These
options are not mutually exclusive and can be undertaken
sequentially or in parallel, depending on the case and
urgency.
Post-marketing withdrawal of a medicinal product be-
cause of drug-attributed deaths can be occasioned by
evidence obtained from individual case reports or case
series, observational studies, randomized comparisons,
or systematic reviews. Withdrawal of products from the
market because of deaths can sometimes be controver-
sial, especially when a causal connection between drug
use and deaths has not been clearly established. It canalso lead to substantial financial losses for manufac-
turers, giving negative incentives.
There have been no studies of the pattern of withdra-
wals of medicinal products to which deaths have been
specifically attributed and the evidence that affects deci-
sions. Building on a preliminary analysis of 284 medica-
tions that have been withdrawn or had major changes to
their labels following reports of adverse drug reactions,
including deaths [5], we have identified medicinal prod-
ucts that have been withdrawn in the last 60 years in as-
sociation with deaths, have searched for the evidence on
which the withdrawal decisions were based, and have ana-
lysed the delays and the worldwide patterns of (drugs)
withdrawal.
We use the terms “withdrawal” and “withdrawn” to in-
dicate that the product has either been voluntarily with-
drawn by the MAH or had its licence revoked by a
regulatory agency. Other terms that are sometimes used
to describe the latter include “banned”, “prohibited”,
“recalled”, and “not (i.e., no longer) approved”.
Methods
We identified products for which death was documented
as a reason for withdrawal between 1950 and December
2013, from the following sources:
 The World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) database
of Consolidated List of Products whose
consumption and/or sale have been banned,
withdrawn, severely restricted, or not approved by
governments (Issues 12 and 14);
 The WHO’s Drug Information (Volumes 1–27);
 The WHO’s Pharmaceuticals Newsletter
(1997–2013);
 The database of withdrawn drugs of the European
Medicines Agency;
 The website of the UK Medicines and Healthcare
products Regulatory Agency (MHRA);
 The website of the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA);
 PubMed, MEDLINE, and Google Scholar, using
search terms including “drug withdrawal”, “fatal*”,
“death(s)”, “voluntary recall”, and related terms;
 Meyler’s Side Effects of Drugs volumes 1–8 and
editions 9–15 and the Side Effects of Drugs Annuals
1–35;
 Stephens’ Detection of New Adverse Drug Reactions,
5th edition [6].
A Medline search strategy is available as Additional
file 1.
To be included in the review, a product must have had
death documented as a reason for withdrawal, irrespect-
ive of whether the deaths had occurred at therapeutic or
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in association with deaths but had been re-introduced or
made available in other, safer, formulations were included.
Products for which death was not specifically mentioned
as a reason for withdrawal from the market were excluded,
as were non-human medicines, herbal products, and non-
prescription medicines.
For each withdrawn product, we extracted data on the
date of marketing authorization, launch date, or date of
first recorded use; the drug class or therapeutic indica-
tion [7]; the date of the first reported death; the first
withdrawal date; the country or countries of withdrawal,
even if death was not reported as a reason for withdra-
wal in all the countries; and the reported mechanism by
which the drug resulted in death. We took the view that
if death was reported as a reason for withdrawal in at
least one country, this was sufficient for inclusion of
other countries in which the drug had been withdrawn
since it was likely to have caused deaths elsewhere, even
if not cited as such. When the exact launch date of a
drug was not available (two cases), its first record of use
in humans, based on a PubMed search, was used as its
launch date.
We used the WHO Consolidated List as the primary
source of information for dates of first launch and first
withdrawal (if reported). These dates were cross-checked
with the corresponding dates from the other sources
listed above.Figure 1 Schematic diagram showing process for inclusion of medic
drug-attributed deaths.We documented the level of available evidence for re-
ports of deaths related to the withdrawn drug using the
tool kit of the Oxford Centre for Evidence-based Medi-
cine [8]. One reviewer [IJO] extracted the data and a
second reviewer [JKA] verified them independently. When
there were discrepancies in the attributed dates (three in-
stances), the reviewers re-checked the dates together and
arrived at a consensus through discussion.
Scatter plots were used to explore the relationship be-
tween launch years and delays to first reports of death
or first withdrawal. Pearson’s χ2 tests were used to com-
pare differences in the frequencies of withdrawals within
1 year of the report of death; P values <0.05 were con-
sidered significant.
Results
We identified 407 medicinal products withdrawn world-
wide (Figure 1). Out of these, we excluded 312 products
because death was not reported as a reason for with-
drawal. Finally, we included 95 products for which death
was documented as a reason for withdrawal in the re-
view (Additional file 2). Most of the drugs were used to
treat neurological or psychiatric disorders (n = 28) or as
analgesics or anti-inflammatory drugs (n = 21); 14 were
used for cardiorespiratory disorders and 9 were anti-
microbial drugs.
The withdrawals occurred between 1957 and 2011.
The longest interval between launch year or year of firstinal products withdrawn after approval because of
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(ethyl nitrite; first reported use 1850, first reported death
1977) [9], and the longest interval between the first
reported death and withdrawal of the medicine was
56 years (phenobarbital; first reported death 1929,
withdrawn 1985 in Sweden [10]).
At least 40% of the drugs were withdrawn in more than
one country, but only 26 (27%) were reportedly withdrawn
“worldwide” (i.e., in all the countries in which they had
been marketed). Sixteen products continued to be mar-
keted in some countries, despite having been withdrawn
in at least two others (Additional file 2). Twelve products
(13%) were withdrawn because they caused deaths after
overdose.
Figure 2 shows the time lapse between the launch of a
withdrawn product and the date of the first reported
death (interval 1); the more recent the launch date, the
sooner deaths were reported. Figure 3 shows the time
lapse between the launch of a withdrawn product and
the date of the first reported withdrawal (interval 2),
which has also shortened over time. In both cases, the
finding was similar when the 12 products withdrawn be-
cause of deaths due to overdose were examined. These
findings applied to the data after 1950 as well as to the
whole set shown (see insets in Figures 2 and 3). In
cases where deaths were due to overdose, the average
time to withdrawal after the first report of death was
13 years; the mean withdrawal interval when deaths
occurred at therapeutic doses was 4 years. We observed


































Figure 2 Launch year versus interval 1 (the time lapse between the
reported death). The red circles indicate medicinal products that were wand first withdrawal year were examined (35 years vs.
15 years).
However, the delay between the first death and the
first withdrawal (interval 3) showed no consistent rela-
tion to the year in which the product was launched, and
did not change consistently over time (Figure 4). Of 81
products launched after 1950, 31 (38%) were withdrawn
within 1 year of the first reported death, 12 (15%) within
the second year, and 38 (47%) more than 2 years after
the first reported death. Similarly, the delay between the
first death and the first withdrawal showed no consistent
relation to the year in which the first death was reported
when six medicinal products withdrawn after 1950 be-
cause of deaths due to overdose were examined (Figure 4).
There were significantly fewer withdrawals in African
and Asian countries than in other countries when com-
paring medications that were withdrawn within 1 year of
the first report of a death and those that were withdrawn
later (P <0.0005). The frequency of respiratory events
that occasioned withdrawal was also significantly lower
in the former (P = 0.04).
The evidence for withdrawal in most cases came from
case reports (79/95; 83%). In three cases, the evidence was
based on the results of case-control studies and in eight
cases on randomized controlled comparisons. In one of
those cases (rosiglitazone) there was also evidence from
cohort studies and a systematic review. The evidence for
withdrawal of two drugs (celecoxib and rofecoxib) was
based on the results of randomized comparisons or meta-
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Figure 3 Launch year versus interval 2 (the time lapse between the launch of a withdrawn product and the date of the first
reported withdrawal). The red circles indicate medicinal products that were withdrawn due to overdose-related deaths.
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sicians; in 17 cases (18%) deaths were reported to regulatory
agencies, and in two cases in clinical trials; other sources in-
cluded a government inquiry and a coroner’s report.
Cardiotoxicity (n = 18), hepatotoxicity (n = 25), and re-
spiratory depression (n = 10, all of which were attributed
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Figure 4 Launch year versus interval 3 (the time lapse between the fi
red circles indicate medicinal products that were withdrawn due to overdoaccounted for 56% of withdrawals. Two drugs (mibefradil
and sorivudine) were withdrawn because interactions
with other medications resulted in deaths. Three drugs
(bicalutamide 150 mg, fenoterol, and nebacumab) were
withdrawn because “accelerated deaths” were reportedly
associated with their use, while pumactant and flosequi-
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rst reported death and the first withdrawal in any country). The
se-related deaths.
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temic absorption associated with its use as a topical an-
tiseptic. Pituitary-derived somatropin was withdrawn
because of deaths due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. L-
tryptophan was withdrawn because of the eosinophilia-
myalgia syndrome with resultant deaths.
Discussion
We have identified 95 products for which death was
cited as a reason for withdrawal between 1950 and 2013.
Cardiotoxicity, hepatotoxicity, and respiratory depres-
sion accounted for over half of the withdrawals. With-
drawals were more common in European countries; few
were reported in Africa.
Evidence for withdrawal
The criteria that determine whether a product should be
withdrawn are not well established, although proposals
have been made [11]. It is likely that in many cases agen-
cies have applied the precautionary principle, defined by
the Wingspread Consensus Statement [12], as follows:
“When an activity raises threats of harm to human
health … precautionary measures should be taken, even
if some cause and effect relationships are not fully estab-
lished scientifically, [in which case] the proponent of
[the] activity … should bear the burden of proof”. The
“proponent” in this case would be the MAH.
The quality of the evidence that led to the withdrawal
of these medicinal products was on the whole poor. In
most instances, it was limited to case reports, and in
only eight instances was it based on randomized com-
parisons. This is consistent with the results of much
smaller previous studies. Of 11 products that were with-
drawn for different reasons during 1999 to 2001, evidence
from spontaneous reports supported the withdrawal of
eight products (73%); randomized trials and comparative
observational studies were cited for only two products
each [13]. In a study of 19 products that were withdrawn
during 2002 to 2011 (at least two studies were reported as
evidence used for withdrawal of 10 products), case reports
were cited in 18 of 19 withdrawals, case-control studies in
four cases, cohort studies in four, randomized controlled
trials in 12, and meta-analysis in five [14]. Similarly, in a
Spanish study of 22 drugs that were withdrawn during
1990 to 1999 because of adverse reactions, case reports
were the main source of information [15].
In the world literature, about 30% of all information
on adverse drug reactions comes from case reports [16],
but in our survey 83% of withdrawals were based on
such evidence. This is consistent with the observation
that suspected adverse reactions that are identified in
case reports are infrequently followed-up with formal
studies to investigate the suspected associations; of 63
suspected adverse drug reactions that were the subjectsof case reports in five medical journals in 1997, 52 were
not subjected to further detailed evaluation and data
from controlled studies that supported the postulated
link between the product and the adverse event were
available in only three cases [17]. However, when death
is suspected to result from the use of a medicine, one
might apply less strict criteria in attributing causality
than for other, less serious, adverse reactions, in order to
give higher priority to their investigation.
Nevertheless, for some of the medicines in this study,
a cause and effect relation could be established. For ex-
ample, overdose with sedative drugs (e.g., pentobarbital
and co-proxamol, with consequent respiratory paralysis
and death) led to withdrawals [18]. For some other drugs,
such as fenoterol and nebacumab, a cause and effect rela-
tion was established indirectly by analysing patterns of
mortality in patients taking the drugs. In some cases,
retrospective evidence of an association was also available;
for example, a marked reduction in mortality rates from
asthma was reported after fenoterol was removed from
the market in New Zealand [19]; after L-tryptophan was
withdrawn in 1989, when epidemiological studies linked
its use to eosinophilia-myalgia syndrome, the incidence
fell markedly [20]. In other cases [21,22], the cause and ef-
fect relation was not clearly demonstrated, and there have
been controversies about whether such agents should have
been removed from the market.
Negative publication bias is possible when deaths re-
sult from the use of medicinal products. For example,
when rofecoxib was withdrawn, the manufacturer’s state-
ment referred to unpublished trial data and did not men-
tion deaths [23]. While regulatory authorities in Europe
withdrew nefazodone because of hepatotoxicity, the ma-
nufacturer stated that they withdrew the product for com-
mercial reasons [24]. In the case of dithiazanine iodide,
only two of eight deaths resulting from the use of the
product were published; the other six were noted in a
pharmaceutical company’s brochure [25]. More recently, a
drug manufacturer received a large fine for withholding
data on the safety of a medicinal product reported to have
caused numerous deaths [26]. Another manufacturer is
also under investigation for the non-reporting of deaths
from patient support programmes [27].
Patterns of withdrawal
There were differences in the patterns of withdrawal in
different countries. For example, in the UK troglitazone
was withdrawn because of deaths due to liver damage,
but in the USA the label was changed to require more
extensive monitoring of liver function. Furthermore, there
were significantly fewer withdrawals in African and Asian
countries than in other countries, when comparing medi-
cations that were withdrawn within 1 year of the first re-
port of a death and those that were withdrawn later.
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wide”, i.e., in all countries in which they had been mar-
keted, although it is unlikely that they were marketed
everywhere. In 16 cases that we could identify, the prod-
uct continued to be marketed in some countries, despite
having been withdrawn in others. Metamizole (dipyrone),
which has been the subject of considerable controversy
[28], provides an excellent example of this (Figure 5). Al-
though the first death was recorded in 1952, metamizole
was first withdrawn from the market (in Norway and
Sweden) only in 1974, and other countries were slower to
withdraw it. Indeed, it was reintroduced in Sweden in
1995 and withdrawn again in 1999, and it has only re-
cently been withdrawn in India [29]. In other countries, it
remained on the market with changes to the label. In
some cases, combination formulations were withdrawn
but single-product formulations remained.
Several reasons explain the withdrawal of a product in
one country and not in another. The frequency of an ad-
verse reaction may differ in different countries, as was
controversially reported with metamizole [30]. In a few
cases different indications for therapy may contribute to
different risks of adverse reactions. In other cases, the
product may be cheaper than alternatives; there is aFigure 5 Different times of withdrawal of metamizole in different courelation between a country’s capacity to restrict danger-
ous drugs and its per caput gross national product [31].
Furthermore, competing interests may play a role in in-
fluencing the pattern of drug withdrawal, even when
deaths have been associated [32]. A recent analysis of
five of the largest private global health foundations con-
cluded that board members’ interests and donors’ invest-
ments (including those from pharmaceutical companies)
are potential conflicts of interest that need to be addressed
in order to prevent a distortion of science and public
health outcomes [33]. Whether an independent group of
reviewers should be tasked with making decisions about
drug withdrawals because of adverse reactions is contro-
versial. In the USA, for example, some authors have advo-
cated that an independent group of reviewers should be
mandated with critically appraising and analysing post-
marketing surveillance data [32,34]; this view has been
contradicted by others who prefer that the FDA be bol-
stered in its drug monitoring strategies [35].
Delays between launch dates and reports of deaths
Several factors may have contributed to shortening the
delay between the development and marketing of a drug
and the first report of a drug-attributed death (interval 1).ntries.
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treated nowadays with each new drug than was the case
in the past, the increasing age of the treated population,
and the increasing use of polypharmacy, whether appro-
priate or inappropriate. Improved pharmacovigilance and
better reporting of suspected adverse reactions, better
methods of signal detection and assigning causality, and
stricter regulation could also contribute.
Improved pharmacovigilance
Modern pharmacovigilance dates from the 1960s [36,37],
and developments over the last 50 years include the ac-
quisition of large numbers of case reports in international
databases, combined with increasing use of statistical me-
thods to analyse agglomerated case reports, endowing
them with greater evidential power [38], the increasing
use of meta-analysis of adverse drug reaction reports
in clinical trials [39], and the introduction of patient
reporting.
Causality assignment
Some adverse drug reactions are definitive (“between-
the-eyes” reactions) [40] and some are so-called “designa-
ted medical events” (i.e., reactions that are almost always
or very often associated with a medicine when they occur)
[41]. In this series, a death that occurred within minutes
of injection of technetium (99mTc) fanolesomab [42] and a
death that occurred immediately after the intravenous ad-
ministration of bismuth tartrate [43] fell into the first of
these categories. For other reactions, several methods of
determining causality (i.e., linking drug-adverse event
pairs causally) have been devised over the last 35 years or
so [44]. However, there are many drawbacks to their use
[45]: they all rely to some extent on clinical judgement,
and physicians tend to overestimate the likelihood of caus-
ality; the criteria used are neither sensitive nor specific
and have poor predictive power; and in comparisons of
different algorithms, agreement has generally been very
poor. It therefore seems unlikely that improvements in
causality assessment in individual cases have contributed
much to the improved time to withdrawal of products that
cause deaths.
Delays between launch dates and withdrawals
The delay between launch date and market withdrawal
(interval 2) shortened as the launch date became more
recent (Figure 3). This is probably attributable to the
shortening in the delay between launch and the first re-
port of death (i.e., interval 1; Figure 2). One would expect
faster withdrawal of a drug from the market if it caused
deaths at therapeutic doses compared with another prod-
uct that caused deaths through overdose, and the evidence
from our review supports this assumption – the average
times to withdrawal from both launch dates and firstreports of deaths were longer with medicinal products
that caused deaths through overdose.
Delays to withdrawals after reports of deaths
In contrast, there was no consistent change in the delay
between reports of death and market withdrawals (inter-
val 3; Figure 4). Manufacturers and regulatory agencies
need to address this problem, by putting in place pro-
cesses to ensure rapid and internationally coordinated
responses about decisions regarding withdrawal of me-
dicinal products from the market if deaths are sus-
pected to be associated with their use. However, it should
be noted that the market share and profitability of par-
ticular drugs would influence the industry’s attitude to
withdrawal.
Drug regulatory activity continues to evolve [46]. For
example, it is a current international regulatory require-
ment that fatal or life-threatening unexpected adverse
reactions must be reported within 15 days [47]. How-
ever, there are discrepancies in the ways in which indi-
vidual regulatory authorities expedite action on such
reports. In Europe, the USA, India, and Australia there
are established standard procedures for initiating drug
withdrawals from the market because of deaths [48-51].
For instance in the USA, if there is a reasonable risk of
death or other serious adverse reactions from use of a
medicinal product, the FDA may ask the MAH to recall
a drug, or mandate the MAH to conduct a recall (Class
I recall), and may also issue a safety alert to notify the
general public about the hazards of the drug [49].
In a 1984 review of 24 products that were withdrawn
during 1974 to 1983, there was no difference in the rates
of withdrawals in the UK and the USA [52]. However, in
an investigation of 26 medicinal products that were
withdrawn in the USA and/or UK during 1971 to 1992,
products that were withdrawn for any reason in the
USA were withdrawn sooner after marketing than in the
UK, which was attributed to more stringent regulation
in the USA, with slower regulatory approval [53]. How-
ever, our data suggest that, at least as far as products
that cause deaths are concerned, changes in product li-
censing in recent years have not shortened the times to
withdrawal. This might, however, be in part due to in-
creased delays in the regulatory process, occasioned by
waiting for the results of further studies into the nature
of the suspected adverse reaction. This implies that
while such studies are being carried out, the medication
should be temporarily withheld pending the results (see
recommendations below).
Limitations
We have no information on the time lapse between the
occurrence of the first death attributed to the drug and
the date on which death was first reported. Indeed, some
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However, such delays are likely to have been short and
unlikely to have affected the results significantly.
Our list of 95 drugs withdrawn may be incomplete be-
cause of negative publication bias. We have identified
about 300 other products that were also withdrawn or
had their labels changed during the period we studied;
some of those may have caused deaths, but since death
was not specifically mentioned in relation to withdrawals
in those cases, we have excluded them.
We do not have data on regulatory actions that may
have been taken in advance of withdrawal. Some of the
withdrawn drugs included in the review may also have
been marketed as over the counter medications in some
countries, and in countries in which regulation is less
stringent, regulatory action would be more difficult. Fur-
thermore, some medicinal products (especially psycho-
tropic drugs) are reported to have caused deaths, but
have not been withdrawn from the market. This may
have been because the benefit-to-harm balance was never-
theless still considered to be favourable or because of poor
regulatory action.
Our conclusions about international patterns of drug
withdrawals are limited by the relative paucity of data in
some countries.
Recommendations
These data suggest that better methods are needed to
detect, document, and report deaths in patients taking
medications in order to reduce delays further, and espe-
cially for deciding how to deal with a product after
deaths have been reported. We advocate a more robust
approach to decision making regarding reports of deaths,
and increased collaboration and co-ordination between
agencies. Increased transparency in the publication of clin-
ical trials data would help [54].
Credits could be given as a reward to enhance repor-
ting of suspected serious adverse reactions. In the UK,
for example, practitioners who promptly report any ser-
ious unexpected suspected adverse reactions to the
MHRA could receive credits through the Quality Out-
comes Framework system, although this could lead to
over-reporting of suspected adverse drug reactions. In
addition, more rigorous monitoring and verification of
deaths and reasons for dropping out during clinical
trials is warranted [15].
If an agency receives a report of a death associated
with a medication, it could suspend the product tem-
porarily while awaiting further information, and contact
other agencies for information about other reports. Sys-
tematic reviews of such reports could then be carried
out and would be enabled by the introduction of in-
ternational standards for reporting suspected adverse
reactions [55,56]. Withdrawal of a product would notnecessarily be warranted on the basis of a single report,
but several reports from disparate sources would arouse
suspicion of a testable association. Natalizumab was with-
drawn temporarily after deaths had been reported, and
reintroduced later, with safeguards, because the benefit-
to-harm balance was perceived to be favourable [57].
Finally, the criteria for determining that an event is a
signal could have a lower threshold when death is the
event. For example, in analysing deaths in comparative
trials (e.g., using placebo), the 90% confidence interval
could be used as a less strict criterion than usual for de-
ciding whether death was a signal worthy of further
investigation.Conclusions
We have identified 95 products for which death was
cited as a reason for withdrawal. The interval between
launch date and reports of deaths has shortened over
the past few decades, and this could be because of better
reporting of suspected adverse reactions or stricter regu-
lation. However, many withdrawals still occur more than
1 or 2 years after the reports of deaths begin to appear.
Furthermore, there are discrepancies in the patterns of
drug withdrawals in different countries, with greater de-
lays in Africa and Asia. These delays and discrepancies
could be mitigated by encouraging prescribers and in-
vestigators to report serious suspected adverse reactions,
by swifter regulatory action when reports appear, and by
international co-ordination of reports.Additional files
Additional file 1: Medline search strategy for identification of
report dates for first report of death and first date of withdrawal.
Additional file 2: Table S1. Medicinal products withdrawn because of
drug-attributed deaths.Abbreviations
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